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ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION BY LAWYERS:
A PROPOSED REDRAFT OF CANON 2 OF THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
By Monroe H. Freedman*
Rules of legal ethics are, broadly speaking, of two kinds.
Rules of the first kind relate to the integrity of the system of
administering justice and are designed to insure that the system
will function effectively and fairly. Those rules include such matters as full access to the legal system, the competence and independence of counsel, preservation of clients' confidences, and
zealous representation within the bounds of the law. Rules of the
second kind are those that are concerned less with the integrity
of the system and more with the conduct of lawyers as members
of a guild or trade association. Such rules, which are principally
anticompetitive, include maintenance of minimum fees and restrictions on advertising and solicitation.
Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility contains
provisions relating both to the integrity of the system and to
restrictions on competition. The thesis of this article is that the
guild, or anticompetitive, provisions of Canon 2 have perverted
the more fundamental provisions of that Canon, those concerned
with the integrity of the system. Accordingly, a proposed redraft
is submitted for consideration.
The "axiomatic norm"' that serves as the headnote to Canon
* A.B., 1951, Harvard College; LL.B., 1954, LL.M., 1956 Harvard University. The
author is Dean and Professor of Law at Hofstra Law School and the author of Lawyers'
Ethics in an Adversary System (1975). He is also Chairman of the Legal Ethics Committee
of the District of Columbia Bar, and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Professional
Responsibility of the Society of American Law Teachers.
A number of members serving on those committees have contributed significantly to
this article (although they do not all agree with it). They include: Gladys Kessler and S.
White Rhyne (both of the Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar), and
Stanley A. Kaplan, Richard L. Rykoff, Alan Scheflin, Carl M. Selinger, and Russell B.
Stevenson (all of the Subcommittee on Professional Responsibility of the Society of American Law Teachers).
1. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILuTY, Preliminary Statement (Feb.
1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE].
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2 is: A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling
its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available. The Ethical Considerations [EC's] and the footnotes to Canon 2 explain the
crucial relationship of that Canon to the integrity of the administration of justice. Members of society "have need for more than
a system of law; they have need for a system of law which functions, and that means they have need for lawyers."' 2 However,
legal problems "may not be self-revealing and often are not
timely noticed." 3 The need for legal services by members of the
public is met, therefore, "only if they recognize their legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking assistance, and are
able to obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel."' Quoting
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (then President of the American Bar
Association), the Code notes that when people are denied their
day in court because ignorance has prevented them from obtaining counsel, there is a denial of the fundamental right to equal
justice under law.' Thus, a "basic tenet" of the professional responsibility of lawyers is that "every person in our society should
have ready access to the independent professional services of a
lawyer of integrity and competence."'
The scope of our failure to achieve equal justice under law,
in the rudimentary sense of providing access to legal services, is
illustrated by an American Bar Association special committee
estimate that effective access to legal services is being denied to
at least 70 percent of our population, which amounts to as many
as 140,000,000 people. Other responsible authorities suggest that
the correct figure is substantially higher.8 Moreover, as recognized in the Code of Professional Responsibility, a principal cause
of the under-use of available legal services is ignorance on the
part of members of the public regarding the need, availability,
and cost of legal services? Furthermore, the Code recognizes that
institutional advertising has been employed for decades,"0 but
2. Cheatham, The Lawyers Role and Surroundings, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 405 (1953),
as quoted in ABA CoDE, Canon 2 n.1.
3. ABA CODE, EC 2-2.
4. Id. EC 2-1.
5. Id. Canon 2 n.3.
6. Id. EC 1-1.
7. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERvicEs, A PRIMER OF PREPAID LEGAL
SERVICES 7 (P. Murphy ed. 1974).
8. Tunney & Frank, Federal Roles in Lawyer Reform, 27 STAN. L. REV. 333, 343 &
n.36 (1975).
9. See ABA CODE, EC 2-1, -2, -6, -7; id. Canon 2 nn.1-7, 17.
10. Id. Canon 2 nn.4-7.
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such efforts obviously have proved inadequate to cope with the
problem.
A dramatic illustration of the relationship between underuse of legal services and ignorance on the part of members of the
public is provided in a study undertaken by James G. Frierson,
who is both an attorney and an Associate Professor of Business
Administration at East Tennessee State University. Professor
Frierson first determined what the charge would be in Johnson
City, Tennessee, to have a lawyer (1) draw a simple will for a
husband, or (2) read and give advice on a two-page consumer
installment contract, or (3) discuss a potential legal problem and
give some general advice, without any research, spending about
30 minutes with the client. He then determined what middleclass people in the same city expected to have to pay for those
services. Frierson discovered that middle-class consumers overestimated lawyers' fees by 91 percent for the drawing of a simple
will, 340 percent for reading and giving advice on a two page
installment sales contract, and 123 percent for 30 minutes of consultation and general advice."
Professor Frierson also found that 75 percent of his sample
had not seen a lawyer on any personal matter within the previous
5 years; that 75 percent had no will, although a substantial number were married with children; and that 75 percent had signed
an installment sales contract in the previous 5 years. 2 On the
basis of his survey, Frierson concluded that average middle-class
consumers do not use the services of a lawyer "primarily because
of their grossly inflated expectations of lawyers' charges." 3
Frierson's study, of course, serves only to confirm what has
been known by the profession and recognized in the Code of Professional Responsibility. As previously mentioned, the headnote
to Canon 2 is that A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession
in FulfillingIts Duty to Make Legal CounselAvailable. The difficulty arises from the fact that the first five Disciplinary Rules
[DR's] under Canon 2 are devoted not to assuring adequate
information about the availability and cost of legal services but,
rather, to restricting the communication of relevant information
by proscribing advertising and solicitation by lawyers. Thus, DR
2-101 forbids a lawyer to use any means of commercial publicity;
11. Affidavit of James G. Frierson, Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v.
American Bar Ass'n, No. 0105-R (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 1975).
12. Id.
13. Frierson, Legal Advertising, 2 BARRISTER 6, 8 (Winter 1975).
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DR 2-102 imposes narrow limitations on the use of such things as
professional cards, letterheads, and telephone directory listings;
DR 2-103 forbids a lawyer to recommend that a non-lawyer retain
the lawyer's services if the non-lawyer has not initiated the contact by seeking legal advice; DR 2-104 says that a lawyer who has
given unsolicited legal advice to a member of the public shall not
accept employment resulting from that advice; and DR 2-105
forbids a lawyer to indicate that he or she specializes in a particu4
lar area of the law. '
Those are the provisions, of course, that have effectively
blocked any real efforts to provide relevant and necessary information to members of the public and have thereby made a mockery of the overriding professional obligation to provide access to
the legal system. It is increasingly being recognized, however,
that the prohibitions against advertising and solicitation are not
only unwise as a matter of public policy, but, as the following
suggests, they are also of dubious validity under both the antitrust laws and the Constitution.
In the antitrust area, the Supreme Court recently decided in
Goldfarb v. VirginiaState Bar 5 that the publication and enforcement by bar associations of minimum fee schedules violate the
Sherman Act. The principal issue in Goldfarb was whether the
practice of law, as a "learned profession," is outside the scope of
the Sherman Act, which is concerned with "trade or commerce."
The Supreme Court held that the sale of a service for money is
"commerce," and went on to observe that, "[i]t is no disparagement of the practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it
has this business aspect ...
."' The Court also noted that,
"[iun the modern world it cannot be denied that the activities
of lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse, and
that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint
on commerce."'"
The Goldfarb opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger
and there was, remarkably, not a single dissent. S'In addition, the
14. In each of those instances, arbitrary exceptions are provided, e.g., self-laudatory
advertising can be purchased in a number of publications approved by the American Bar
Association, a lawyer may solicit employment among friends, relatives, and former clients,
and specialists in patents, trademarks, and admiralty law may so designate themselves.
15. 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
16. Id. at 2013. But see text accompanying note 20 infra.
17. Id. at 2014.
18. Justice Powell, who had been president of the Virginia State Bar, did not participate.
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Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has adopted the
position that a proscription of advertising and solicitation by lawyers also violates the Sherman Act.19
I believe, however, that the Goldfarb decision is neither the
most appropriate nor the most reliable basis for attacking the
proscriptions against advertising and solicitation. First, it is not
at all clear that the Supreme Court will extend
Goldfarb that far.
2
In a footnote to the opinion, the Court said:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining
whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which orginated in
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could
properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any
other situation than the one with which we are confronted
today.
That paragraph is, of course, pregnant with miscarriage.
Apart from the possibility that the Court may decline to
extend Goldfarb to reach advertising and solicitation, Congress
could amend the Sherman Act to exclude the legal profession, or
to exclude particular practices, such as the restrictions on advertising and solicitation. Of even greater importance, moreover, is
the fact that every state legislature appears to have the power to
nullify the Sherman Act in that same way. Indeed, one of the
arguments in Goldfarb was that fee-setting by the bar associations had been sanctioned by the State of Virginia and that the
practice was, therefore, immune from attack under the "state
action" exception to the Sherman Act.' The Supreme Court
found, however, that there was no Virginia statute requiring feesetting but, rather, that state law simply did not refer to fees,
leaving regulation of the profession to the Virginia Supreme
Court. Further, although the state supreme court's ethical codes
mentioned advisory fee schedules, they did not direct the bar
associations to adopt them nor did they require the type of price
19. See Law Firm Advertising, 44 U.S.L.W. 2008 (July 1, 1975).
20. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2013 n.17 (1975).
21. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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floor that resulted from the bar associations' activities. 22
Significantly, however, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the states have "broad power" to regulate the
practice of professions. The Court also held that "in some instances the State may decide that 'forms of competition usual in the
business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a
profession.' ",23 The Court added that, "[t]he interest of the
States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are
essential to the primary governmental function of administering
justice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts.' "24
Thus, in deciding that certain forms of anticompetitive conduct
by attorneys can fall within the reach of the Sherman Act, "we
intend no diminution of the authority of the State to regulate its
professions." ' Therefore, the ultimate impact of the Goldfarb
decision is, potentially, a very limited one, since the Court did not
foreclose the states from nullifying the effect of the Sherman Act
on the legal profession.
Antitrust policies are not, in any event, the most appropriate
concerns in assessing advertising and solicitation by attorneys. As
indicated at the outset, the Ethical Considerations dealing with
access to the legal system are rooted in the fundamental right of
equal justice under law. In addition, the right of lawyers to communicate with potential clients, and the rights of members of the
public to be informed by those communications, are protected by
a variety of constitutional rights, including freedom of speech, the
right to petition for redress of grievances, freedom of association,
and the right to due process of law. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has already held in a series of cases of major importance that rules
of professional ethics, including those relating to advertising and
solicitation, must give way to constitutional rights.
The first case in that series was NAACP v. Button,2 which

considered solicitation of clients in the context of efforts of the
NAACP to recruit plaintiffs for school desegregation cases. The
NAACP called a series of meetings inviting not only its members
and poor people, but all members of the community. At those
22. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2014-15 (1975).
23. Id. at 2016, quoting United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326,
336 (1952). See also Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 61113 (1935).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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meetings, the organization's paid staff attorneys took the platform to urge those present to authorize the lawyers to sue in their
behalf.27 The NAACP maintained the ensuing litigation by defraying all expenses, regardless of the financial means of a particular plaintiff.
Virginia contended that the NAACP's activities constituted
improper solicitation under a state statute and fell within the
traditional state power to regulate professional conduct. The
Supreme Court held, however, that "the State's attempt to
equate the activities of the NAACP and its lawyers with commonlaw barratry, maintenance and champerty, and to outlaw them
accordingly, cannot obscure the serious encroachment ....
upon protected freedoms of expression." [Footnote omitted.]28
29
The Court concluded:
Thus it is no answer to the constitutional claims asserted by
petitioner to say, as the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
said, that the purpose of these regulations was merely to insure
high professional standards and not to curtail free expression.
For a State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional
misconduct, ignore constitutional rights.
Subsequently, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,3" the Supreme Court considered
the question of solicitation in a case in which a union's legal
services plan resulted in channeling all or substantially all of the
railroad workers' personal injury claims, on a private fee basis, to
lawyers selected by the union and touted in its literature and at
meetings. The Court again upheld the solicitation on constitutional grounds, despite the objection of the two dissenting Justices that by giving constitutional protection to the solicitation of
personal injury claims, the Court "relegates the practice of law
to the level of a commercial enterprise," "degrades the profession," and "contravenes both the accepted ethics of the profession and the statutory and judicial rules of acceptable conduct." 3'
In United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association,32
27. The Court has recognized the critical importance of solicitation to effective litigation in noting that proscription of solicitation in Button would have "seriously crippled"
the efforts of the NAACP. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,
223 (1967).
28. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1962).
29. Id. at 438-39.
30. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
31. Id. at 9 (Clark & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
32. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
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the Supreme Court dealt with the argument that Button should
be limited to litigation involving major political issues and should
not be extended to personal injury cases. The Court held that:"
The litigation in question is, of course, not bound up with political matters of acute social moment, as in Button, but the First
Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the
extent it can be characterized as political. "Great secular
causes, with small ones are guarded . ..

."

Finally, in United Transportation Union v. State Bar of
Michigan34 the Court reversed a state injunction designed, in Justice Harlan's words, "to fend against 'ambulance chasing.' ",3. In
that case a union paid investigators to keep track of accidents,
to visit injured members, (taking contingent fee contracts with
them), and to urge the members to engage named private attorneys who were selected by the union and who had agreed to
charge a fee set by prior agreement with the union. The investigators were also paid by the union for any time and expenses incurred in transporting potential clients to the designated lawyers'
offices to enter retainer agreements.
In approving that arrangement, the Court reiterated that
"collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment. 3' 6 What is important to bear in mind, however, is

that: (1) the attorneys in question were not in-house counsel for
the union, but were private practitioners; (2) the attorneys earned
substantial fees; (3) the cases were not "public interest" cases in
the restricted sense, but were ordinary personal injury cases; and
(4) the attorneys were retained as a result of the activities of
"investigators," paid by the union, whose job it was to ascertain
where accidents had occurred, to visit the victims as promptly as
possible, to "tout" the particular lawyers and, if necessary, to
take the victim to the lawyers' office to get a contingent fee contract signed.3
33. Id. at 223, quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
34. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
35. Id. at 597 (Harlan, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part).

36. Id. at 585.
37. The only question not decided by the Court was whether the investigators could
properly have been paid directly by the lawyers. The dissenting Justices would have
disapproved it, while the majority simply did not reach that issue, on the ground that it
was not in the record before them. It is difficult, however, to see why a significant distinction should turn upon who pays the investigator. A person unsophisticated about the need
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It might be suggested that the three union cases involved
group legal services, with the solicitation restricted to members
of the union. Although there are references in those cases to rights
of association, other language in the opinions is much broader.
The Court noted in United Mine Workers that "the First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it
can be characterized as political." 38 Similarly, the first amendment does not protect speech and assembly only in the context
of unions or other membership associations. Further, the people
who were solicited in the Button case were not limited to members of the NAACP.
On the same day that Goldfarb was decided, the Supreme
Court handed down an opinion in Bigelow v. Virginia,39 a case
which has not attracted as much attention as Goldfarb in connection with advertising and solicitation by lawyers, but which is of
far more significance. In Bigelow, the defendant was convicted of
violating a provision of the Virginia anti-abortion statute by publishing an advertisement offering to make low-cost arrangments
for legal abortions in New York. The importance of the Bigelow
case to the issue of advertising by lawyers is emphasized by the
similarity between arguments typically made in support of the
anti-advertising provisions of the Code and the arguments made
by the Virginia Supreme Court in affirming Bigelow's conviction.
That court held that the advertisement "'clearly exceeded an
informational status' and 'constituted an active offer to perform
a service, rather than a passive statement of fact.' "40 In rejecting
Bigelow's first amendment claim, the Virginia court said that a
" 'commercial advertisement . . . may be constitutionally prohibited by the state,'" particularly "'where, as here, the advertising relates to the medical-health field,'-"1 i.e., a professional
area in which the state's regulatory power presumably would be
at its maximum. In addition, the court noted that the purpose of
the statute was to insure that pregnant women in Virginia, making decisions with respect to abortions, did so" 'without the commercial advertisement pressure usually incidental to the sale of
for and the availability of legal services, needs that information regardless of whether he
or she is a member of a union and regardless of who pays the informant.
38. 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967).
39. 95 S. Ct. 2222 (1975).
40. Bigelow v. Virginia, 95 S. Ct. 2222, 2228-29 (1975), quoting Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 193, 191 S.E.2d 173, 174 (1972).
41. Bigelow v. Virginia, 95 S. Ct. 2222, 2229 (1975), quoting Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 193-95, 191 S.E.2d 173, 174-76 (1972).
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a box of soap powder.' "42 Those of course, are precisely the kinds
of arguments that are made in support of regulations against
advertising by lawyers.
Significantly, in striking down the Virginia statute on first
amendment grounds, the Supreme Court relied on Button for the
proposition that a state cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights simply by labeling the speech "solicitation" or
"commercial advertising."43 In the course of reaching that conclusion, the Court severely restricted, if it did not overrule, Valentine
v. Chrestensen," which had suggested that commercial advertising was not fully protected by the first amendment."
Finally, the Court made a strong bridge between the protected advertising in Bigelow and advertising by lawyers, by
stressing the fact that the Bigelow advertisement contained information about legal issues:4"
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience-not only to readers possibly in need of the services offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine
interest in, the subject matter or the law of another State and
its development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia
... .Also, the activity advertised pertained to constitutional
interests. [Citation omitted.] Thus, in this case, appellant's
First Amendment interests coincide with the constitutional interests of the general public.
Thus, the Bigelow advertisement was given first amendment
protection expressly because it was directed to a "diverse audience" (not just the membership of an association), conveying
information to those with a "general curiosity about, or genuine
interest in . . .the law . . . and its development . . . ."I Presumably, that same language would be descriptive of any advertisements offering legal services. Moreover, the reference in the
Bigelow advertisement to the fact that abortions are legal in New
York was made only in passing. Certainly the communication of
legal information ("Abortions are legal in New York") was quite
42.
wealth,
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Bigelow v. Virginia, 95 S. Ct. 2222, 2229 (1975), quoting Bigelow v. Common213 Va. 191, 196, 191 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1972).
Bigelow v. Virginia, 95 S. Ct. 2222, 2235 (1975).
316 U.S. 52 (1942).
Bigelow v. Virginia, 95 S. Ct. 2222, 2231 & n.6 (1975).
Id. at 2233.
Id.
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limited, and there was no explicit suggestion of the desirability
of law reform. In the same sense, therefore, any advertisement
relating to the availability of legal services would convey information of "potential interest and value" to people having a "general
curiosity" about the law, its development, or law reform.
It seems abundantly clear, therefore, that the present provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, forbidding advertising and solicitation by lawyers, are constitutionally invalid.
Accordingly, it is appropriate, if not urgent, that we undertake
the task of redrafting Canon 2.
In an earlier effort to that end, I circulated a draft of proposed amendments to the members of the Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar and the Subcommittee of
Professional Responsibility of the Society of American Law
Teachers." Circulation of that draft resulted in a number of very
thoughtful comments, many of which have been incorporated
into the proposal set forth at the end of this article. It should be
noted, however, that not all of the commentators will be entirely
satisfied with the present draft.
One concern that has been expressed is that advertising by
lawyers may prove to be "undignified" in some instances. Although that viewpoint may be characterized as a squeamish one,
I confess that I share it. The appearance of justice, though not as
important as the substance of it, is nonetheless a matter of legitimate concern. If lawyers conduct themselves in an undignified
way, the law itself may, to that extent, lose the appearance of
dignity. On the other hand, I find it impossible to draft a disciplinary standard that would forbid lack of dignity and yet withstand
constitutional attack. In reversing a conviction in a rather extreme case of undignified expression, Justice Harlan observed
that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."4 9 "Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our
most precious freedoms," 5 and standards like "undignified" or
"in good taste" clearly cannot meet that test.
Although it would not be feasible to draft a Disciplinary Rule
forbidding lawyers to be undignified, the structure of the Code
does permit the expression of aspirational guides in the Ethical
Considerations. Accordingly, the draft proposed here does urge in
48. The text of that draft appears in 173 N.Y.L.J. 102, May 28, 1975, at 1, cols. 1-2.
49. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). The contested language was "Fuck
the Draft."
50. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
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the Ethical Considerations that "lawyers should strive to provide
information to the public in ways that comport with the dignity
of the profession and that do not tend to demean the administration of justice."
Since the earlier proposed redraft of Canon 2 would have
imposed no prohibition on advertising and solicitation other than
to forbid false and misleading representations, comments also
expressed concern with a variety of offensive kinds of conduct
that might result. For example, police officers might hand out
lawyers' cards at the scenes of accidents." Accident victims,
strapped into stretchers, might be importuned by hospital orderlies to retain particular lawyers. Lawyers or their representatives
might interrupt funeral services to solicit probate work. People
might be solicited through unwanted telephone calls or visits at
home. And so on.
Those concerns are legitimate, and an effort should be made
to deal with them. That effort, however, should not consist of
prohibitions on communications by rules that are broader than
necessary to serve the legitimate governmental purpose. As the
52
Supreme Court observed in Shelton v. Tucker:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose.
Certainly it is not necessary to impose a broad ban on advertising
and solicitation by lawyers in order to deal with such cases as the
hospital orderly or the police officer. For example, if it is inappropriate for an orderly to solicit legal business (or, indeed, to speak
to a patient at all, other than as required by the performance of
hospital duties) the hospitals can, and presumably do, issue appropriate directives to their employees. It would seem entirely
appropriate, therefore, to discipline a lawyer who knowingly induced a breach of such an obligation by an orderly or by a police
officer or any other employee. Similarly, a lawyer could be disci51. Interestingly, one member of the Subcommittee on Professional Responsibility,
objecting to individual advertising, suggested as a desirable alternative that police officers
might be required to distribute institutional advertising about legal services at accident
scenes.
52. 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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195

plined for soliciting business in a cemetery or any place else where
business activity may be generally forbidden.
The appropriate approach to dealing with such cases, as well
as with those cases involving harassing telephone calls or unwelcome visits to homes, is suggested in four Supreme Court decisions involving closely analogous situations. The first case is
Martin v. Struthers.5 3 There the Court invalidated a city ordinance that made it unlawful for any person distributing handbills, circulars, or other advertising matter, to ring a doorbell or
otherwise summon a householder to the door. The Court recognized a legitimate governmental interest in such a prohibition
since "burglars frequently pose as canvassers, either in order that
they may have a pretense to discover whether a house is empty
and hence ripe for burglary, or for the purpose of spying out the
premises in order that they may return later."54 The Court held,
however, that the right of freedom of speech and press embraces
not only the right to distribute literature, but also necessarily
protects the right to receive it. 5 Moreover, the city could have
used a less drastic means to achieve its end, and one that would
not have impinged upon those first amendment rights:56
The dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods, leaving to each householder the full right
to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the
Constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination of
ideas.
That is, the ordinance "substitute[d] the judgment of the community for the judgment of the individual householder," subjecting the distributor to criminal punishment for annoying another
person "even though the recipient of the literature . . . is in fact
glad to receive it. ' ' 51 The Court noted, however, that its holding
did not prevent the city from punishing those who call at a home
"in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant
"58

Martin v. Struthers appeared to be severely limited in the
subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Breard v.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

319 U.S. 141 (1943).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 148.
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0 a decision written by Justice Reed, who had disAlexandria,"
sented in Martin. In Breard the ordinance restricting door-to-door
solicitation was directed against those who failed to obtain the
prior consent of the owners of the residences solicited. Thus the
legislative standard in Breard did not meet the test established
in Martin, because the Court in Martin would have required an
"explicit command from the owners to stay away.""0 In dealing
with the first amendment aspect of the case, however, Justice
Reed distinguished Martin v. Struthers expressly on the ground
that that case had involved the distribution of leaflets advertising
a religious meeting, whereas the defendant in Breard had been
selling magazines. The selling, Justice Reed said, "brings into the
transaction a commercial feature." 6' Emphasizing that point, he
noted that the Court in Martin had directed attention to the fact
that the ordinance there had not been aimed "solely at commercial advertising."6 Thus, insofar as Breard appeared to represent
a retreat from the Court's position in Martin v. Struthers, it was
based expressly upon the notion that "commercial speech" is not
entitled to full constitutional protection. As indicated in the discussion above,63 that idea has recently been decisively rejected by
the Supreme Court in Bigelow v. Virginia.
Even before the rejection of Valentine v. Chrestensen in
Bigelow, 4 a standard similar to that approved in Breard was
unanimously struck down by the Court. The case of Lamont v.
Postmaster General" involved a federal statute which permitted
the Post Office to hold "communist political propaganda" arriving from abroad, unless the addressee requested delivery. The
Supreme Court invalidated that statute on the ground that it
abridged the addressees' first amendment rights by burdening
the exercise of those rights with an affirmative obligation on the
part of the addressee. By contrast, in Rowan v. Post Office66 the
Supreme Court upheld a statute which did not interpose the
Postmaster General between the sender and the addressee but,
rather, established a procedure whereby the householder could
reject certain mailings in advance. Chief Justice Burger, writing
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

341 U.S. 622 (1951).
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943).
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951).
Id.
See text accompanying notes 39-47 supra.
See text accompanying notes 44 & 45 supra.
381 U.S. 301 (1965).
397 U.S. 728 (1970).
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for a unanimous Court, quoted with approval from Martin v.
Struthers in holding that the freedom to distribute information
to every citizen can only be limited if the power to prevent a
distributor from calling at the home is left with the individual

homeowner. On that authority the statute in Rowan was upheld
because "the mailer's right to communicate is circumscribed only

by an affirmative act of the addressee giving notice that he wishes

no further mailings from that mailer. 6 7 Thus, in Lamont and
Rowan, Breard was ignored and the rule of Martin v. Struthers
was applied.
The proposed redraft takes its cue from those decisions. A

community, or professional, judgment is not substituted for that
of the individual citizen with respect to whether solicitation is

desirable. Rather, a lawyer would be subject to professional discipline for soliciting a potential client only after that person has

given the lawyer notice that he or she does not want to receive
communications from the lawyer.
In sum, then, the proposed redraft of Canon 2 would (1)

eliminate the general proscription against advertising and solicitation, but would (2) urge lawyers to advertise in a dignified

manner, (3) forbid lawyers to solicit in ways that would violate
valid laws or regulations, or that would involve the breach of a

contractual or other legal obligation of the person through whom
the lawyer seeks to communicate (e.g., a hospital attendant or

police officer), and (4) further forbid lawyers to solicit anyone who
has made it clear that he or she would prefer to be left alone."8

That approach, it is sub itted, is pursuant to the need to assure
access to legal services by providing adequate information to the
public, and is consistent with the requirements of the first

amendment.
67. Id. at 737.
68. Adoption of the redraft of Canon 2 as proposed in this article would make it
unnecessary to amend the present DR 2-103(D). That section permits a lawyer to cooperate "in a dignified manner" with the legal service activities (including advertising) of
approved legal assistance offices and some prepaid legal service plans. (Debate has focused in substantial part on the desirability of "open" as opposed to "closed" panels. See
Dunne, PrepaidLegal Services Have Arrived, 4 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 22 (1975).) Since DR
2-103(D) is principally concerned with stating an exception to the ban on advertising and
solicitation, that section would be unnecessary if the ban were lifted, as is here proposed.
DR 2-103(D) also includes a proviso that the lawyer's independent professional judgment must be exercised on behalf of the client "without interference or control by any
organization or other person." That issue, however, is fully covered in Canon 5, which
relates to conflicts of interest. See ABA CODE, DR 5-107(B); id. EC 5-23, -24; id. Canon 5
n.27. See also id. EC 5-1, -21; id. Canon 5 n.25.
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ProposedAmendments to Canon 29
CANON 2-A LAWYER SHOULD ASSIST THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN FULFILLING ITS DUTY TO MAKE LEGAL
COUNSEL AVAILABLE
Ethical Considerations
EC 2-1. The need of members of the public for legal services
is met only if they recognize their legal problems, appreciate the
importance of seeking assistance, and are able to obtain the services of [acceptable] competent legal counsel whose fees they can
afford. Hence, important functions of the legal profession are to
educate [laymen] members of the public to recognize their problems, to facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers,
and to assist in making legal services fully available.
Recognition of Legal Problems
EC 2-2. The legal profession should assist [laymen]
members of the public to recognize legal problems because such
problems may not be self-revealing and often are not timely noticed. Therefore, lawyers [acting under proper auspices] should
encourage and participate in educational and public relations
programs concerning our legal system with particular reference to
legal problems that frequently arise. [Such educational programs
should be motivated by a desire to benefit the public rather than
to obtain publicity or employment for particular lawyers. Examples of permissible activities include preparation of institutional
advertisements and professional articles for lay publications and
participation in seminars, lectures, and civic programs. But a
lawyer who participates in such activities should shun personal
publicity.]
EC 2-3. Whether a lawyer acts properly in volunteering advice to a [layman] member of the public to seek legal services
depends upon the circumstances. The giving of advice that one
should take legal action could well be in fulfillment of the duty
of the legal profession to assist [laymen] members of the public
in recognizing legal problems. The advice is proper [only if]
whenever it is motivated in whole or in part by a desire to protect
one who does not recognize that he or she may have legal problems or who is ignorant of his or her legal rights or obligations.
[Hence, the advice is improper if motivated by a desire to obtain
69. Brackets indicate proposed deletions from the existing text of the Code, while
italics indicate proposed additions.
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personal benefit, secure personal publicity, or cause litigation to
be brought merely to harass or injure another. Obviously, a lawyer should not contact a non-client, directly or indirectly, for the
purpose of being retained to represent him for compensation.]
EC 2-4. [Since motivation is subjective and often difficult
to judge, the motives of a lawyer who volunteers advice likely to
produce legal controversy may well be suspect if he receives professional employment or other benefits as a result. A lawyer who
volunteers advice that one should obtain the services of a lawyer
generally should not himself accept employment, compensation,
or other benefit in connection with that matter. However, it is not
improper for a lawyer to volunteer such advice and render resulting legal services to close friends, relatives, former clients (in
regard to matters germane to former employment), and regular
clients.] The purpose of encouraging lawyers to volunteer advice
to members of the public is to fulfill the duty to make legal
counsel available by informing members of the public of their
legal rights and of the availability of effective legal assitance.
Accordingly, lawyers should scrupulously avoid making any false
or misleading statements to members of the public regarding
their rights or regarding the ability of lawyers in general or of
particularlawyers to provide effective assistance.
EC 2-5. A lawyer who writes or speaks for the purpose of
educating members of the public to recognize their legal problems
should carefully refrain from giving or appearing to give a general
solution applicable to all apparently similar individual problems,
since slight changes in fact situations may require a material
variance in the applicable advice; otherwise, the public may be
misled and misadvised. Talks and writings by lawyers for
[laymen] members of the public should caution them not to
attempt to solve individual problems upon the basis of the information contained therein.
Selection of a Lawyer: Generally
EC 2-6. Formerly a potential client usually knew the reputations of local lawyers for competency and integrity and therefore
could select a practitioner in whom he or she had confidence. This
traditional selection process worked well because it was initiated
by the client and the choice was an informed one.
EC 2-7. Changed conditions, however, have seriously restricted the effectiveness of the traditional selection process.
Often the reputations of lawyers are not sufficiently known to
enable [laymen] members of the public to make intelligent
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choices. The law has become increasingly complex and specialized. Few lawyers are willing and competent to deal with every
kind of legal matter, and many [laymen] members of the public
have difficulty in determining the competence of lawyers to render different types of legal services. The selection of legal counsel
is particularly difficult for transients, persons moving into new
areas, persons of limited education or, means, and others who
have little or no contact with lawyers. In addition, many people
feel uncertain about whether lawyers are interested in helping
them, and about the possible expense of preliminaryinterviews,
and they are therefore reluctant to approachlawyers to seek legal
counsel.
EC 2-8. [Selection of a lawyer by a layman often is the result
of the advice and recommendation of third parties-relatives,
friends, acquaintances, business associates, or other lawyers. A
layman is best served if the recommendation is disinterested and
informed. In order that the recommendation be disinterested, a
lawyer should not compensate another person for recommending
him, for influencing a prospective client to employ him, or to
encourage future recommendations.] Because of changed conditions, lack of knowledge about the availabilityof lawyers, and the
reluctance of many people to seek needed legal assistance,people
are, as a practicalmatter, being denied effective legal assistance.
In order to inform people of the availabilityof counsel, increase
the likelihood of intelligent selection of attorneys by members of
the public, and eliminate misunderstandingabout fees, lawyers
should freely provide information about their availability to accept particularkinds of cases, their experience in handling such
cases, and their fees.
Selection of a Lawyer: Professional Notices and Listings
EC 2-9. The traditional ban against advertising by lawyers[,
which is subject to certain limited exceptions, is rooted in the
public interest. Competitive advertising would encourage extravagant, artful, self-laudatory brashness in seeking business and
thus could mislead the layman. Furthermore, it would inevitably
produce unrealistic expectations in particular cases and bring
about distrust of the law and lawyers. Thus, public confidence in
our legal system would be impaired by such advertisments of
professional services. The attorney-client relationship is personal
and unique and should not be established as the result of pressures and deceptions. History has demonstrated that public confidence in the legal system is best preserved by strict, self-
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imposed controls over, rather than by unlimited, advertising.]
has had the practical effect of causing many people to forfeit
legitimate rights because of ignoranceof those rights.In addition,
that ban has fostered the unfortunateimpression that lawyers are
uninterested in assisting in the redress of grievances of any but
the most wealthy and sophisticated members of our society.
Thus, distrust of lawyers has become common, andpublic confidence in our legal system has been impaired.
EC 2-10. [Methods of advertising that are subject to the
objections stated above should be and are prohibited. However,]
The Disciplinary Rules recognize the value of giving assistance in
the selection process through forms of advertising that furnish
identification of a lawyer [while avoiding such objections. For
example, a lawyer may be identified in the classified section of
the telephone directory, in the office building directory, and on
his letterhead and professional card. But at all times the permitted notices should be dignified and accurate.] and such additional information that is accurateand that might assist a potential client in making an informed choice of an attorney. Care
should be taken, however, to avoid creating unrealistic expectations in particularcases. In addition, lawyers should strive to
provide information to the public in ways that comport with the
dignity of the profession and that do not tend to demean the
administrationof justice.
EC 2-11. The name under which a lawyer conducts his or her
practice may be a factor in the selection process. The use of a
trade name or an assumed name should be avoided if it could
mislead [laymen] members of the public concerning the identity, responsibility, and status of those practicing thereunder.
[Accordingly, a lawyer in private practice should practice only
under his own name, the name of a lawyer employing him, a
partnership name composed of the name of one or more of the
lawyers practicing in a parthership, or, if permitted by law, in the
name of a professional legal corporation, which should be clearly
designated as such.] For many years some law firms have used a
firm name retaining one or more names of deceased or retired
partners and such practice is not improper if the firm is a bona
fide successor of a firm in which the deceased or retired person
was a member, if the use of the name is authorized by law or by
contract, and if the public is not misled thereby. However, the
name of a partner who withdraws from a firm but continues to
practice law should be omitted from the firm name in order to
avoid misleading the public.
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EC 2-12. A lawyer occupying a judicial, legislative, or public
executive or administrative position who has the right to practice
law concurrently may allow his or her name to remain in the
name of the firm if he or she actively continues to practice law
as a member thereof. Otherwise, [his] the lawyer's name should
be removed from the firm name, and he or she should not be
identified as a past or present member of the firm; and [he] the
lawyer should not [hold himself] be held out as being a practicing lawyer.
EC 2-13. In order to avoid the possibility of misleading persons with whom he or she deals, a lawyer should be scrupulous
in the representation of his or her professional status. [He] A
lawyer should not hold himself or herself out as being a partner
or associate of a law firm if he or she is not one in fact, and thus
should not hold himself or herself out as a partner or associate if
he or she only shares offices with another lawyer.
[EC 2-14. In some instances a lawyer confines his practice
to a particular field of law. In the absence of state controls to
insure the existence of special competence, a lawyer should not
be permitted to hold himself out as a specialist or as having
special training or ability, other than in historically expected
fields of admiralty, trademark, and patent law.]
[EC 2-15. The legal profession has developed lawyer referral
systems designed to aid individuals who are able to pay fees but
need assistance in locating lawyers competent to handle their
particular problems. Use of a lawyer referral system enables a
layman to avoid an uninformed selection of a lawyer because such
a system makes possible the employment of competent lawyers
who have indicated an interest in the subject matter involved.
Lawyers should support the principle of lawyer referral systems
and should encourage the evolution of other ethical plans which
aid in the selection of qualified counsel.]
Disciplinary Rules 0
DR 2-101. A lawyer shall not knowingly make any representation about his or her ability, background, or experience, or that
of the lawyer's partner or associate, that is false or misleading,
and that might reasonably be expected to induce reliance by a
member of the public.
DR 2-102. A lawyer shall not knowingly give a client or poten70. For the current version of the Disciplinary Rules under Canon 2, see Appendix.
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tial client a false or misleading impression of the state of the law,
such as by overstating the likelihood that a particularoutcome
will result from litigation, or by stating what is merely the lawyer's opinion about the law as if it were a conclusively established
rule of law.
DR 2-103. A lawyer shall not solicit or advertise to potential
clients in any way that would violate a valid law or regulation,
or a contractual or other legal obligation of the person through
whom the lawyer seeks to communicate.
DR 2-104. A lawyer shall not solicit a potential client who has
given the lawyer adequate notice that he or she does not want to
receive communications from the lawyer.
DR 2-105. A lawyer shall not hold himself or herself out as
having a partnershipwith one or more other lawyers unless they
are in fact partners.A partnershipshall not be formed or continued between or among lawyers licensed in differentjurisdictions
unless all enumerationsof the members and associatesof the firm
on its letterhead and in other listings make clear the jurisdictional limitationson those members and associatesof the firm not
licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions;however, the same
7
firm name may be used in each jurisdiction.
71. Proposed DR 2-105 is derived substantially from ABA CODE, DR 2-102(C), (D).
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APPENDIX
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 2-101
Publicity in General.
(A) A lawyer shall not prepare, cause to be
prepared, use, or participate in the use
of, any form of public communication
that contains professionally selflaudatory statements calculated to
attract lay clients; as used herein,
"public communication" includes,
but is not limited to, communication
by means of television, radio, motion
picture, newspaper, magazine, or
book.
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself,
or his partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm, as a lawyer through newspaper
or magazine advertisements, radio or
television announcements, display
advertisements in city or telephone
directories, or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize
or permit others to do so in his behalf.
However, a lawyer recommended by,
paid by or whose legal services are furnished by, a qualified legal assistance
organization may authorize or permit
or assist such organization to use
means of dignified commercial publicity, which does not identify any lawyer
by name, to describe the availability
or nature of its legal services or legal
service benefits. This rule does not
prohibit limited and dignified identification of a lawyer as a lawyer as well
as by name:
(1) In political advertisements when
his professional status is germane
to the political campaign or to a
political issue.
(2) In public notices when the name
and profession of a lawyer are
required or authorized by law or
are reasonably pertinent for a
purpose other than the attraction
of potential clients.
(3) In routine reports and announcements of a bona fide business,
civic, professional, or political

organization in which he serves
as a director or officer.
(4) In and on legal documents prepared by him.
(5) In and on legal textbooks, treatises, and other legal publications, and in dignified advertisements thereof.
(6) In communications by a qualified legal assistance organization, along with the biographical
information permitted under DR
2-102(A)(6), directed to a member or beneficiary of such organization.
(C) A lawyer shall not compensate or give
any thing of value to representatives
of the press, radio, television, or other
communication medium in anticipation of or in return for professional
publicity in a news item.
DR 2-102 Professional Notices, Letterheads, Offices, and Law
Lists.
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not use professional cards, professional announcement cards, office signs, letterheads, telephone directory listings,
law lists, legal directory listings, or
similar professional notices or devices,
except that the following may be used
if they are in dignified form:
(1) A professional card of a lawyer
identifying him by name and as
a lawyer, and giving his addresses, telephone numbers, the
name of his law firm, and any
information permitted under DR
2-105. A professional card of a
law firm may also give the names
of members and associates. Such
cards may be used for identification but may not be published in
periodicals, magazines, newspapers, or other media.
(2) A brief professional announcement card stating new or
changed associations or ad-
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phone directory or directories for
the geographical area or areas in
which the lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a significant part of his clientele resides
and in the city directory of the
city in which his or the firm's office is located; but the listing
may give only the name of the
lawyer or law firm, the fact he is
a lawyer, addresses, and telephone numbers. The listing shall
not be in distinctive form or type.
A law firm may have a listing in
the firm name separate from that
of its members and associates.
The listing in the classified section shall not be under a heading
or classification other than "Attorneys" or "Lawyers," except
that additional headings or classifications descriptive of the
types of practice referred to in
DR 2-105 are permitted.

dresses, change of firm name, or
similar matters pertaining to the
professional office of a lawyer or
law firm, which may be mailed to
lawyers, clients, former clients,
personal friends, and relatives. It
shall not state biographical data
except to the extent reasonably
necessary to identify the lawyer
or to explain the change in his
association, but it may state the
immediate past position of the
lawyer. It may give the names
and dates of predecessor firms in
a continuing line of succession. It
shall not state the nature of the
practice except as permitted
under DR 2-105.
(3) A sign on or near the door of the
office and in the building directory identifying the law office.
The sign shall not state the nature of the practice, except as
permitted under DR 2-105.
A letterhead of a lawyer identifying him by name and as a lawyer,
and giving his addresses, telephone numbers, the name of his
law firm, associates and any information permitted under DR 2105. A letterhead of a law firm
may also give the names of members and associates, and names
and dates relating to deceased
and retired members. A lawyer
may be designated "Of Counsel"
on a letterhead if he has a continuing relationship with a lawyer or law firm, other than as a
partner or associate. A lawyer or
law firm may be designated as
"General Counsel" or by similar
professional reference on stationery of a client if he or the firm
devotes a substantial amount of
professional time in the representation of that client. The letterhead of a law firm may give the
names and dates of predecessor
firms in a continuing line of succession.
(5) A listing of the office of a lawyer
or law firm in the alphabetical
and classified sections of the tele-

(4)
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(6)

A listing in a reputable law list or
legal directory giving brief biographical and other informative
data. A law list or directory is not
reputable if its management or
contents are likely to be misleading or injurious to the public or to
the profession. A law list is conclusively established to be reputable if it is certified by the
American Bar Association as
being in compliance with its rules
and standards. The published
data may include only the following: name, including name of law
firm and names of professional
associates; addresses and telephone numbers; one or more
fields of law in which the lawyer
or law firm concentrates; a statement that practice is limited to
one or more fields of law; a statement that the lawyer or law firm
specializes in a particular field of
law or law practice but only if
authorized under DR 2-105
(A)(4); date and place of birth;
date and place of admission to

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 1

[Vol. 4, 1976]

Hofstra Law Review
the bar of state and federal
courts; schools attended, with
dates of graduation, degrees, and
other scholastic distinctions;
public or quasi-public offices;
military service; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching
positions; memberships, offices,
committee assignments, and section memberships in bar associations; memberships and offices in
legal fraternities and legal societies; technical and professional
licenses; memberships in scientific, technical and professional
associations and societies; foreign language ability; names and
addresses of references, and, with
their consent, names of clients
regularly represented.
(B) A lawyer in private practice shall not
practice under a trade name, a name
that is misleading as to the identity of
the lawyer or lawyers practicing under
such name, or a firm name containing
names other than those of one or more
of the lawyers in the firm, except that
the name of a professional corporation
or professional association may contain "P.C." or "P.A." or similar symbols indicating the nature of the organization, and if otherwise lawful a
firm may use as, or continue to include in, its name the name or names
of one or more deceased or retired
members of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession. A lawyer who assumes a judicial,
legislative, or public executive or
administrative post or office shall not
permit his name to remain in the
name of a law firm or to be used in
professional notices of the firm during
any significant period in which he is
not actively and regularly practicing
law as a member of the firm, and during such period other members of the
firm shall not use his name in the firm
name or in professional notices of the
firm.
(C) A lawyer shall not hold himself out as
having a partnership with one or more
other lawyers unless they are in fact
partners.

(D) A partnership shall not be formed or
continued between or among lawyers
licensed in different jurisdictions unless all enumerations of the members
and associates of the firm on its letterhead and in other permissible listings
make clear the jurisdictional limitations on those members and associates
of the firm not licensed to practice in
all listed jurisdictions; however, the
same firm name may be used in each
jurisdiction.
(E) A lawyer who is engaged both in the
practice of law and another profession
or business shall not so indicate on his
letterhead, office sign, or professional
card, nor shall he identify himself as a
lawyer in any publication in connection with his other profession or business.
(F) Nothing contained herein shall prohibit a lawyer from using or permitting the use of, in connection with his
name, an earned degree or title derived therefrom indicating his training
in the law.
DR 2-103

Recommendation of Professional Employment.

(A) A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of
himself, his partner, or associate to a
non-lawyer who has not sought his
advice regarding employment of a
lawyer.
(B) A lawyer shall not compensate or give
anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure his
employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in his employment by a
client, except that he may pay the
usual and reasonable fees or dues
charged by any of the organizations
listed in DR 2-103(D).
(C) A lawyer shall not request a person or
organization to recommend or promote the use of his services or those of
his partner or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm,
as a private practitioner, except that:
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(1)

(2)

He may request referrals from a
lawyer referral service operated,
sponsored, or approved by a bar
association and may pay its fees
incident thereto.
He may cooperate with the legal
service activities of any of the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103 (D)(1) through
(4) and may perform legal services for those to whom he was recommended by it to do such work
if:

207

A military legal assistance office.
A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a
bar associatioii.
(4)

(a) The person to whom the recommendation is made is a
member or beneficiary of
such office or organization;
and
(b) The lawyer remains free to
exercise his independent
professional judgment on
behalf of his client.
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a
person or organization that furnishes
or pays for legal services to others to
promote the use of his services or those
of his partner or associate or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm
except as permitted in DR 2-101(B).
However, this does not prohibit a lawyer or his partner or associate or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm from being recommended, employed or paid by, or cooperating with,
one of the following offices or organizations that promote the use of his
services or those of his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm if there is no interference with the exercise of independent professional judgment in
behalf of his client:
(1) A legal aid office or public defender office:
(a) Operated or sponsored by a
duly accredited law school.
(b) Operated or sponsored by a
bona fide nonprofit community organization.
(c) Operated or sponsored by a
governmental agency.
(d) Operated, sponsored, or
approved by a bar association.
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Any bona fide organization that
recommends, furnishes or pays
for legal services to its members
or beneficiaries provided the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Suck organization, including any affiliate, is so organized and operated that no
profit is derived by it from
the rendition of legal services by lawyers, and that, if
the organization is organized for profit, the legal
services are not rendered by
lawyers employed, directed,
supervised or selected by it
except in connection with
matters where such organization bears ultimate liability of its member or beneficiary.
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his
partner, nor associate, nor
any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm, nor
any non-lawyer shall have
initiated or promoted such
organization for the primary
purpose of providing financial or other benefit to such
lawyer, partner, associate or
affiliated lawyer.
(c) Such organization is not
operated for the purpose of
procuring legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer
as a private practitioner
outside of the legal services
program of the organization.
(d) The member or beneficiary
to whom the legal services
are furnished, and not such
organization, is recognized
as the client of the lawyer in
the matter.
(e) Any member or beneficiary
who is entitled to have legal
services furnished or paid
for by the organization may,
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if such member or beneficiary so desires, select counsel
other than that furnished,
selected or approved by the
organization for the particular matter involved; and the
legal service plan of such
organization provides appropriate relief for any
member or beneficiary who
asserts a claim that representation by counsel furnished, selected or approved
would be unethical, improper or inadequate under the
circumstances of the matter
involved and the plan provides an appropriate procedure for seeking such relief.
(f) The lawyer does not know or
have cause to know that
such organization is in violation of applicable laws,
rules of court and other legal
requirements that govern its
legal service operations.
(g) Such organization has filed
with the appropriate disciplinary authority at least
annually a report with respect to its legal service
plan, if any, showing its
terms, its schedule of benefits, - its : subscription
charges, agreements with
counsel, and financial results of its legal service activities or, if it has failed to
do so, the lawyer does not
know or have cause to know
of such failure.
(E) A lawyer shall not accept employment
when he knows or it is obvious that the
person who seeks his services does so
as a result of conduct prohibited
under this Disciplinary Rule.
Suggestion of Need of Legal
DR 2.104
Services.
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited
advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall
not accept employment resulting from
that advice, except that:
(1) A lawyer may accept employ-
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ment by a close friend, relative,
former client (if the advice is germane to the former employment), or one whom the lawyer
reasonably believes to be a client.
(2) A lawyer may accept employment that results from his participation in activities designed to
educate laymen to recognize
legal problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel, or to
utilize available legal services if
such activities are conducted or
sponsored by a qualified legal
assistance organization.
(3) A lawyer who is recommended,
furnished or paid by a qualified
legal assistance organization
enumerated in DR 2-103 (D)(1)
through (4) may represent a
member or beneficiary thereof, to
the extent and under the conditions prescribed therein.
(4) Without affecting his right to
accept employment, a lawyer
may speak publicly or write for
publication on legal topics so
long as he does not emphasize his
own professional experience or
reputation and does not undertake to give individual advice.
(5) If success in asserting rights or
defenses of his client in litigation
in the nature of a class action is
dependent upon the joinder of
others, a lawyer may accept, but
shall not seek, employment from
those contacted for the purpose
of obtaining their joinder.
Limitation of Practice.
DR 2-105
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself out
publicly as a specialist or as limiting
his practice, except as permitted
under DR 2-102(A)(6) or as follows:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice
before the United States Patent
Office may use the designation
"Patents," "Patent Attorney," or
"Patent Lawyer," or any combination of those terms, on his letterhead and office sign. A lawyer
engaged in the trademark practice may use the designation
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"Trademarks," "Trademark At(1) rhe time and labor required, the
novelty and difficulty of the
torney," or "Trademark Lawyer," or any combination of those
questions involved, and the skill
terms, on his letterhead and ofrequisite to perform the legal
fice sign, and a lawyer engaged in
service properly.
the admiralty practice may use
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the
the designation "Admiralty,"
client, that the acceptance of the
"Proctor in Admiralty," or "Adparticular employment will premiralty Lawyer," or any combiclude other employment by the
nation of those terms, on his letlawyer.
terhead and office sign.
(3) The fee customarily charged in
(2) A lawyer may permit his name to
the locality for similar legal servbe listed in lawyer referral service
ices.
offices according to the fields of
(4)
The amount involved and the
law in which he will accept referresults obtained.
rals.
(5)
The time limitations imposed by
(3) A lawyer available to act as a
the client or by the circumstanconsultant to or as an associate of
ces.
other lawyers in a particular
(6) The nature and length of the probranch of law or legal service
fessional relationship with the
may distribute to other lawyers
and publish in legal journals a
client.
dignified announcement of such
(7) The experience, reputation, and
availability, but the announceability of the lawyer or lawyers
ment shall not contain a repreperforming the services.
sentation of special competence
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or conor experience. The announcetingent.
ment shall not be distributed to
(C)
A
lawyer
shall not enter into an arlawyers more frequently than
rangement for, charge, or collect a
once in a calendar year, but it
contingent fee for representing a demay be published periodically in
fendant in a criminal case.
legal journals.
(4) A lawyer who is certified as a spe- DR 2-107 Division of Fees Among Lawyers.
cialist in a particular field of law
or law practice by the authority (A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal
having jurisdiction under state
services with another lawyer who is
law over the subject of specializanot a partner in or associate of his law
tion by lawyers may hold himself
firm or law office, unless:
out as such specialist but only in
(1) The client consents to employaccordance with the rules prement of the other lawyer after a
scribed by that authority.
full disclosure that a division of
DR 2-106 Fees for Legal Services.
fees will be made.
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agree(2) The division is made in proporment for, charge, or collect an illegal
tion to the services performed
or clearly excessive fee.
and responsibility assumed by
each.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a
review of the facts, a lawyer of ordi(3) The total fee of the lawyers does
nary prudence would be left with a
not clearly exceed reasonable
definite and firm conviction that the
compensation for all legal servfee is in excess of a reasonable fee.
ices they rendered the client.
Factors to be considered as guides in
(B) This Disciplinary Rule does not prodetermining the reasonableness of a
hibit payment to a former partner or
fee include the following:
associate pursuant to a separation or
retirement agreement.
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DR 2-108

Agreements Restricting the
(3) A lawyer who withdraws from
Practice of a Lawyer.
employment
shall
refund
promptly any part of a fee paid in
(A) A lawyer shall not be a party to or
advance that has not been
participate in a partnership or emearned.
ployment agreement with another
lawyer that restricts the right of a law- (B) Mandatory withdrawal.
yer to practice law after the terminaA lawyer representing a client betion of a relationship created by the
fore a tribunal, with its permission if
agreement, except as a condition to
required by its rules, shall withdraw
payment of retirement benefits.
from employment, and a lawyer repre(B) In connection with the settlement of a
senting a client in other matters shall
controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not
withdraw from employment, if:.,
enter into an agreement that restricts
(1) He knows or it is obvious that his
his right to practice law.
client is bringing the legal action,
DR 2-109
Acceptance of Employment.
conducting the defense, or asserting a position in the litigation, or
(A) A lawyer shall not accept employment
is otherwise having steps taken
on behalf of a person if he knows or it
for him, merely for the purpose of
is obvious that such person wishes to:
harassing or maliciously injury(1) Bring a legal action, conduct a
ing any person.
defense, or assert a position in lit(2)
He knows or it is obvious that his
igation, or otherwise have steps
continued employment will retaken for him, merely for the pursult in violation of a Disciplinary
pose of harassing or maliciously
Rule.
injuring any person.
(3) His mental or physical condition
(2) Present a claim or defense in litirenders it unreasonably difficult
gation that is not warranted
for him to carry out the employunder existing law, unless it can
ment effectively.
be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modifica(4) He is discharged by his client.
tion, or reversal of existing law.
(C) Permissive withdrawal.
DR 2-110 Withdrawal from EmployIf DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, a
ment.
lawyer may not request permission to
(A) In general.
withdraw in matters pending before a
tribunal, and may not withdraw in
(1) If permission for withdrawal from
other matters, unless such request or
employment is required by the
such withdrawal is because:
rules of a tribunal, a lawyer shall
not withdraw from employment
(1) His client:
in a proceeding before that tri(a) Insists upon presenting a
bunal without its permission.
claim or defense that is not
(2) In any event, a lawyer shall not
warranted under existing
withdraw from employment until
law and cannot be suphe has taken reasonable steps to
ported by good faith arguavoid foreseeable prejudice to the
ment for an extension, modrights of his client, including givification, or reversal of existing due notice to his client, allowing law.
ing time for employment of other
(b) Personally seeks to pursue
counsel, delivering to the client
an illegal course of conduct.
all papers and property to which
(c) Insists that the lawyer purthe client is entitled, and
sue a course of conduct that
complying with applicable laws
is illegal or that is prohiband rules.
ited under the Disciplinary
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Rules.
(d) By other conduct renders it
unreasonably difficult for
the lawyer to carry out his
employment effectively.
(e)

Insists, in a matter not
pending before a tribunal,
that the lawyer engage in
conduct that is contrary to
the judgment and advice of
the lawyer but not prohibited under the Disciplinary
Rules.

(f) Deliberately disregards an
agreement or obligation to
the lawyer as to expenses or
fees.
(2)

likely to result in a violation of a
Disciplinary Rule.
(3)

His inability to work with cocounsel indicates that the best
interests of the client likely will
be served by withdrawal.

(4)

His mental or physical condition
renders it difficult for him to
carry out the employment effectively.

(5)

His client knowingly and freely
assents' to termination of his
employment.

(6)

He believes in good faith, in a
proceeding pending before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find
the existence of other good cause
for withdrawal.

His continued employment is
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